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We often describe people who do the “right” thing as being “on 
a moral high ground”, or we say that they are “taking the high road”. 
There are also other similar sayings that refer to people behaving 
morally as “high-minded” or “upstanding” individuals. All of these 
images suggest a metaphorical connection between the concept of 
morality and the spatial orientation of vertical height. Specifically, 
they suggest that people who behave morally hold a position that is 
higher above ground than those who behave less morally. But are 
there cognitive consequences of being so high above ground – and 
thus, so distant to the world “down below” – that they would process 
their world differently?
Recent research on metaphorical thinking adopts an embodied 
cognition view, suggesting that people use their concrete physical 
sensations to describe abstract psychological experiences (Bargh 
2006; Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002). For example, metaphors in-
volving vertical height often have an embodied basis. In contexts 
of social power, powerful people are said to be “up high”, such that 
individuals with social authority attend to high spatial locations 
quicker than low ones (Moeller, Robinson and Zabelina 2008). In 
many religions, “God is most high”, and people perceive others as 
being more religious when their pictures are displayed at the top of a 
page rather than the bottom (Chasteen, Burdzy, and Pratt 2009). And 
people often give “thumbs up” to communicate positive feedback, 
stemming from the perception that anything “up” is good but “down” 
is bad (Meier and Robinson 2004). These findings suggest that moral 
metaphors referring to vertical height or the physical sensation of 
being high above ground may also have a similar embodied basis. 
We posit that a consequence of behaving morally is that the ver-
tical height increases the distance to the world down below, affect-
ing how people high above ground would cognitively process their 
world. According construal level theory, as distance (vs. closeness) 
increases, so does abstract processing (Trope and Liberman 2003). 
Consider spectators sitting in the highest rows of a sports stadium, 
and hence are vertically high from where the main action is located. 
They describe their experiences as “squinting to see ant-sized play-
ers”, and only see the broader aspects of the game, not its finer de-
tails. Building on these links between metaphorical thinking, embod-
ied cognition, and construal level theory, we thus hypothesize and 
find in four experiments that people who do the right thing process 
their world abstractly.
Experiment 1 demonstrated the main effect that moral thinking 
leads to abstract processing. To prime moral or less moral thinking, 
we had undergraduate students write about an instance in their lives 
in which they did the “right” or “wrong” thing, respectively. They 
then completed the Behavioral Identification Form (BIF; Vallacher 
and Wegner 1989). As predicted, participants who recalled behaving 
morally selected more abstract descriptions on the BIF than those 
who recalled behaving less morally. We also ruled out mood as an 
alternative explanation for our findings.
Experiments 2 and 3 aimed to explore how moral thinking 
may influence specific cognitive consequences of abstract thinking. 
In Experiment 2, we reason that people who process abstractly pay 
little attention to details, and so they should be worse at analytical 
reasoning than those who process concretely (Friedman and Förster 
2011). To prime moral or less moral thinking, we had undergraduates 
write stories about themselves using either positively- or negative-
ly-valenced words, such as kind or greedy, respectively. They then 
completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick 2005). As 
expected, participants in the moral prime scored lower on the CRT 
than those in the less moral prime. Mood had no effect. Meanwhile, 
in Experiment 3, we hypothesized that people who do the right thing 
are more creative than those who do the wrong thing (Förster, Ep-
stude, and Özelsel 2009). Undergraduates received the same prime as 
Experiment 1, in addition to a control condition. They then generated 
as many creative ways of using a brick as possible. Planned contrasts 
revealed that participants in the moral prime generated more ways to 
use a brick creatively than those in the control, who generated more 
than those in the less moral prime. 
Finally, Experiment 4 examined how moral thinking may influ-
ence consumer preferences. Mechanical Turk participants received 
the same moral or less prime as Experiment 1. They then saw an 
ad for the “Simply Orange” brand of orange juice that emphasized 
either the brand’s abstract, future benefits or its concrete, immedi-
ate benefits. Participants who recalled behaving morally had more 
favourable attitudes toward Simply Orange when the ad was in an 
abstract than a concrete frame. Conversely, participants who recalled 
behaving less morally had more favourable attitudes toward the ad in 
a concrete than an abstract frame. 
Across four experiments, this research demonstrates that meta-
phors like “on a high ground” and “taking the high road” are linked 
to embodied cognitions. More specifically, this link can cause people 
doing the right thing to subsequently process their world abstractly. 
Our findings may also offer another explanation for other conse-
quences of moral thinking, such as licensing. Furthermore, our pres-
ent findings encourage future research to understand morality not in 
isolation, but in terms of physically-grounded concepts.
Table 1
Experiment 2: Correct responses on the CrT.








58.3% 60.8% 63.2% 1.14
p-level .241 .059 .008 .027
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